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SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES
1986
This Synopsis highlights significant legal developments which oc-
curred in immigration law in 1986. The Supreme Court decided
only one immigration case during this period, dealing with the
definition of "child" in Immigration and Nationality Act section
244 suspension of deportation cases. The lower federal courts were
highly active, dealing with a wide range of important immigration
issues. The most significant development in 1986 was the passage
by the 99th Congress of the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA). Passage of IRCA culminates six years of con-
gressional attempts to reach an agreement on immigration reform.
Seemingly cutting both ways, IRCA provides tough employer
sanctions while offering generous legalization provisions and mul-
tiple safeguards for the humane administration of new policies.
INTRODUCTION
By presidential proclamation, July 4, 1986, was declared "Na-
tional Immigrants Day."' On Liberty Weekend, "all America cele-
brate[d] the memory of those hardy immigrants, who, symbolically
at least, looked up and saw the Statue of Liberty lifting her lamp
beside the golden door. It [was] a time to smile, to weep, to sigh
contentedly."' 2 Meanwhile, despite widespread sympathy for immi-
1. Proclamation No. 5510, 51 Fed. Reg. 24, 509 (1986). The presidential procla-
mation reads, in pertinent part:
Since 1820, more than 52 million immigrants have come to the United States
from all over the world. They have sought and found a new and better life for
themselves and their children in this land of liberty and opportunity. The mag-
net that draws them is freedom and the beacon that guides them is hope.
America offers liberty for all, encourages hope for betterment, and nurtures
great expectations. In this free land a person can realize his dreams - going as
far as talent and drive can carry him. In return America asks each of us to do
our best, to work hard, to respect the law, to cherish human rights, and to
strive for the common good.
2. L.A. Times, July 4, 1986, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
grants, "[t]here is strong and growing public support for new restric-
tions on immigration."
'3
This Synopsis outlines significant developments in immigration
law during fiscal year 1986. The United States Supreme Court de-
cided only one immigration case in 1986, INS v. Hector," dealing
with the definition of "child" in Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 (INA) section 244 suspension of deportation cases. The lower
federal courts rendered significant decisions in several areas, includ-
ing: administrative law and procedure; attorneys; bond conditions;
criminal offenses; deportation procedure; domicile; estoppel; extradi-
tion; Filipino war veterans; the fourth amendment; labor problems;
the Mariel boatlift; marriage fraud; miscellaneous offensive uses of
the court system; renunciation of United States citizenship; and visa
petitions.
The 99th Congress played a decisive role in formulating and shap-
ing United States immigration policy for years to come. On October
17, 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act
of 1986 (IRCA). 5 IRCA is composed of three essential sections: (1)
employer sanctions for knowingly hiring undocumented aliens; (2)
legalization for aliens who entered the United States without docu-
mentation before January 1, 1982; and (3) special protection and
legalization for foreign agricultural workers. Numerous other provi-
sions of IRCA make scattered changes in current immigration law.
Congress also passed two other significant bills in 1986. The Mar-
riage Fraud Amendments' mandate stricter requirements for ob-
taining permanent residency and criminal penalties for marriage
fraud. The Consular Efficiency Amendments 7 attempt to streamline
the consular visa process by eliminating duplicative government
activity.
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ACTIVITY
The Supreme Court was not active in immigration law in 1986.
The Court decided only one immigration case - INS v. Hector.8
The Court granted certiorari in five cases 9 and denied certiorari in
3. N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
4. 107 S. Ct. 379 (1986) (per curiam).
5. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1987). See generally Lungren, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 277 (1987), in this issue.
6. Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639, 100
Stat. 3537 (1987) [hereinafter Marriage Fraud Amendments].
7. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-653,
100 Stat. 3655 (1987) [hereinafter Consular Efficiency Amendments].
8. 107 S. Ct. 379 (1986) (per curiam).
9. In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 767 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted,
106 S. Ct. 1181 (1986), the Court certified the following issue:
Whether an alien's burden of proving eligibility for asylum pursuant to Section
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fourteen cases.10
208(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. Sec.
1158(a), is equivalent to his burden of proving eligibility for withholding of
deportation pursuant to Section 243(h) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h).
63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 187 (1986). Oral argument was heard by the Court on Octo-
ber 7, 1986. On March 9, 1987 the Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, held that both the
plain meaning and the legislative history of Immigration and Nationality Act [hereinaf-
ter INA] sections 208(a) and 243(h) indicate that different standards apply under the
two sections. 55 U.S.L.W. 4313 (1987).
In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 781 F.2d I 11 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 107
S. Ct. 59 (1986), the Court will review an Eighth Circuit decision holding that "an
executed deportation order is subject to collateral attack as a defense to criminal charges
of unauthorized reentry following deportation in violation of INA Sec. 276 on a showing
that the alien was not accorded due process at the deportation hearing." 63 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 890-91 (1986).
In United States v. Kungys, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 431
(1986), the Court will review a Nazi denaturalization case. The Court of Appeals in
Kungys applied the test of materiality promulgated in the controversial Supreme Court
decision of Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) to find that the defendant's
misrepresentations were material.
In Hohri v. United States, 782 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir.) cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 454
(1986), the Court will decide the following issues:
1. Whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
exclusive jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1295(a)(2) over the appeal in a case
brought under both the Tucker Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA);
and, if not, whether the Federal Circuit nonetheless has exclusive jurisdiction
when the FTCA claim is frivolous because plaintiffs never filed an administra-
tive claim as required by 28 U.S.C. sec. 2675(a).
2. Whether the Takings Clause claims brought by Japanese-Americans and
resident Japanese aliens for losses incurred during World War II are barred by
the six-year statute of limitations. (28 U.S.C. sec. 2401).
63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1075 (1986).
In Abourezk v. Reagan, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666
(1986), the Court will decide the following issues:
1. Whether 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182(a)(27) permits denial of a visa to an alien only
if his activities - and not just his presence or entry - would be prejudicial to
the public interest.
2. Whether 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182(a)(27) permits denial of a visa to an alien
based on foreign policy concerns only if those concerns are independent of -
and not merely in addition to - the alien's affiliation with organizations listed
in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1182(a)(28).
63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1180 (1986); see infra text accompanying notes 200-06.
10. In a split vote, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Liphete v. Stierheim,
455 So. 2d 1348 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 829 (1986). In
Liphete, a Florida court held that Haitain aliens who do not have permanent residence
status are incapable of declaring a Florida home as their permanent home and are thus
precluded from seeking a homestead tax exemption. Justices Blackmun and Marshall
voted to grant certiorari. See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 48 (1986).
In Lachica v. INS, 774 F.2d 1174 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 805 (1986),
the Court denied review of an unreported Ninth Circuit decision. The lower court in
Lachica denied the petitioner's application for a continuance for further hearing on his
application for voluntary departure, found him deportable, and denied voluntary depar-
ture. See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 48 (1986); 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1172 (1985).
INS v. Hector
On November 17, 1986, the Supreme Court issued a per curiam
opinion granting certiorari and reversing the unreported Third Cir-
Two denaturalization cases were denied certiorari by the Court: United States v.
Kowalchuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1188 (1986) and
Maikovskis v. INS, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2915 (1986).
Both cases involved former Nazi supporters who concealed their wartime activities when
immigrating to the United States. Each lower court concluded that each petitioner's mis-
representations were "material" and warranted deportation. The courts applied Chaunt
v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960), which held that the government must prove that a
truthful answer "might have been useful" in an investigation of the applicant "possibly
leading to the discovery of other facts warranting denial of citizenship." Id. at 355. See
63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 187-88, 520 (1986); 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1058-65
(1985).
In United States v. Kairys, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258
(1986), the Court declined review of a third Nazi deportation case involving two issues.
First, whether the denaturalization ground of illegal procurement, which had been
dropped from the denaturalization provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1505 (1982) [hereinafter INA] and restored in the 1961 amendment to
INA section 340(a), could be constitutionally applied retroactively to a naturalization
decree obtained while illegal procurement was not part of the statute. Second, whether
the Constitution guarantees a jury trial in denaturalization cases. The Seventh Circuit
concluded that retroactive application of the illegal procurement amendment, INA §
340(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), did not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
facto laws. Kairys, 782 F.2d at 1383. Additionally, the court held that denaturalization
proceedings are civil in nature. Therefore, "due process [is] satisfied by a fair trial before
an impartial decisionmaker." Id. at 1384.
In Linnas v. INS, 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986), the
Court denied certiorari to an ex-Nazi's constitutional challenges to the Holtzman
Amendment, INA §§ 241(a)(19), 243(h), 244(e). See infra text accompanying notes
102-12.
In Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
1198 (1986), the Court's denial of certiorari resulted in the first extradition to Israel
under the 1963 United States-Israel extradition treaty. The treaty covers war crimes
committed during World War II. In Demjanjuk, Israel requested the United States to
extradite petitioner to stand trial for murder committed during World War II. The Sixth
Circuit held, among other things, that the mass murder of Jews in concentration camps
was murder within the meaning of the treaty. See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 188
(1986).
In Garcia-Mir v. Smith, 766 F.2d 1478 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1213
(1986), the Court denied review of a case involving the detention and repatriation of
Cuban "Marielitos." The Eleventh Circuit noted that the power of federal courts to re-
view exclusion orders is severely limited and that the "well-founded fear" of persecution
standard is appropriate in asylum cases. See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 253 (1986); 62
INTERPRETER RELEASES 680-86 (1985); see also Synopsis, Significant Developments in
the Immigration Laws of the United States 1985, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 441, 459-62
(1986).
In Kahlenberg v. INS, 763 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1636
(1986), the Court denied review of a case involving a request for adjustment of status
under 8 C.F.R. § 245 (1985) as a nonpreference immigrant. Petitioner requested a
waiver of the labor certification requirement under 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(B)(4) (1985). The
immigration judge found petitioner ineligible, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
dismissed the appeal and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES
367 (1986); 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 710-16 (1985).
In Kalin v. Casillas, 780 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1643
(1986), the Court denied review of an unreported Fifth Circuit decision. Kalin involved a
pro se petitioner trying to immigrate from Canada to the United States. Petitioner's
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cuit decision in Hector v. INS.11 The case involved an alien seeking
suspension of deportation pursuant to Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) section 244(a)(1 ).12 At issue was Hector's ability to
prove the third statutory requirement of section 244(a)(1) - ex-
treme hardship to herself or her child. Hector claimed that deporta-
tion would cause extreme hardship to her two nieces, both of whom
were United States citizens, who were living with Hector and attend-
ing an American school.
Both the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals (BIA) refused to hear Hector's argument claiming that a niece
is not a "child" within the meaning of section 244(a)(1). The Third
Circuit remanded the case to the BIA ordering that testimony be
heard as to whether a relationship existed that was functionally
equivalent to a parent-child relationship.13 The Supreme Court re-
versed, finding the plain language of section 244(a)(1) so compelling
that the BIA is not required to consider the hardship to third parties
other than a spouse, parent, or child, as defined by the INA. 4 The
Court found that the "statutory definition of the term 'child' is par-
ticularly exhaustive,"1 5 limiting the definition to "an unmarried le-
allegations against the INS District Director and the United States for negligence in the
handling of his case were dismissed by the district court on defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment. See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 367 (1986).
In Sagermark v. INS, 767 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2895
(1986), the Court denied rehearing of the appeal of a Swedish national requesting discre-
tionary asylum pursuant to INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 and withholding of deportation
under INA § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). Sagermark claimed that due to his massive
political campaign in Sweden against the government, he would be jailed if returned. The
immigration judge rejected Sagermark's claim, concluding that he could not demonstrate
a "well-founded fear of persecution." See 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 498 (1986).
In Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986),
the Court denied rehearing the appeal of a petitioner seeking political asylum. See infra
text accompanying notes 133-38.
In Sachdev v. INS, 788 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986), the
Court denied rehearing an argument that unless the INS strictly complies with the notice
requirements in INA § 205, 8 U.S.C. § 1155, a revocation of an approved visa petition
has no effect. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86.
In Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 644 (1986), the
Court denied certiorari in a case involving judicial review of an INS District Director's
denial of an application for asylum. The Seventh Circuit held that the District Director's
decision "involves considerations of foreign and domestic policy and administrative effi-
ciency and is clearly committed to the political branches of the government." Id. at 828.
11. 782 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1985), rev'd per curiam, 107 S. Ct. 379 (1986).
12. INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254.
13. Hector, 107 S. Ct. at 381; see also Tovar v. INS, 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir.
1980).
14. Hector, 107 S. Ct. at 381.
15. Id.
gitimate or legitimated child or stepchild under 21 years of age."16
The Hector opinion effectively overrules Tovar v. INS.17 The Tovar
court advocated a functional approach to defining "child" in section
244(a)(1) cases, which tended to expand the statutory definition.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
In Flores v. Bowen,18 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held: (1)
aliens holding "Silva"1 9 letters are entitled to collect Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) until such time as the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA) repeals the applicable federal regulation author-
izing the aliens to do so20 or the INS properly revokes the alien's
work authorization; and (2) the government cannot supersede valid
regulations through internal agency instructions.
The Flores controversy centered on an SSA directive21 to all field
employees instructing them to deny SSI benefits to "Silva" aliens
unless independent evidence of eligibility could be established. The
fact that the SSA regulation, which dictates how an alien can prove
permanent residency under color of law, had not been repealed by
Congress did not deter the SSA.12 The Flores court struck down the
directive, citing "the black-letter principle that properly enacted reg-
ulations have the force of law and are binding on the government
until properly repealed. 23
The Second Circuit, in Dina v. Attorney General of the United
States,24 heard the argument of a J-1 visa holder denied a section
1182(e)2 5 two-year foreign residency waiv.er. Petitioner argued that
16. INTERPRETER RELEASES 1084, 1085 (1986).
17. 612 F.2d 794 (3d Cir. 1980).
18. 790 F.2d 740 (9th Cir. 1986).
19. In 1977 a district court in Illinois ordered the INS to send approximately
250,000 letters to specifically identified aliens authorizing the aliens to remain in the
United States and obtain employment. Silva v. Levi, No. 76-C4268 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 10,
1977), modified on other grounds sub nom. Silva v. Bell, 605 F.2d 978 (7th Cir. 1979).
These letters became known as Silva letters. Flores, 790 F.2d at 741.
20. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1618(a)(3) (1985).
21. P.O.M.S. GN E00303.150, noted in Flores, 790 F.2d at 741.
22. Section 416.1618(a)(3) reads:
(a) What you should give us. You can prove you are permanently residing in
the United States under color of law by giving us -
(B) An Arrival-Departure Record (INS Form 1-94) endorsed "Voluntary De-
parture Granted - Employment Authorized" (this form and an INS letter are
given to persons affected by a United States District Court order issued March
10, 1977) ....
For a discussion of the color of law requirement, see Rubin, The Color of Law Test
Governing Noncitizen Elibilityfor Public Benefits, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 411 (1987), in
this issue.
23. Flores, 790 F.2d at 742 (citing United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy,
347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954)).
24. 793 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1986).
25. INA § 212(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(e) (Supp. 1985).
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an unfavorable recommendation by the United States Information
Agency (USIA) does not necessarily prohibit the Attorney General
from granting the waiver application. The court rejected petitioner's
argument and adopted the First Circuit's decision in Silverman v.
Rogers.26 The Silverman court "looked to legislative history to con-
clude that a waiver could not be obtained without the positive rec-
ommendation of the Secretary of State (who under the earlier ver-
sion of section 1182(e) . . . performed the function now fulfilled by
the USIA.). 12 7 The court also rejected petitioner's second argument
that the USIA abused its discretion when denying petitioner's waiver
application. The government, relying on the Supreme Court opinion
in Heckler v. Chaney,28 argued that "review is not to be had if the
statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard
against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion."2' 9 The
Dina court followed the Heckler decision and denied petitioner's
waiver application."0
In Olinayan v. District Director, INS,3 the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered its own jurisdiction in an appeal from a final deportation order
to review a collateral decision of an underlying District Director.32
The court held that if the tests for exclusive appellate review under
INA section 106(a)3 3 are met, the district court has no jurisdiction
to review deportation decisions. 34 Conversely, if the section 106(a)
tests are not met, "exclusive jurisdiction for initial review of those
issues lies in the district court."
3 5
In Nocon v. INS,36 the Third Circuit considered the issue of
whether "failure to file timely a petition for review within six months
of [a] final deportation order pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1 105a(a)(1),
though filing a timely motion for reconsideration with the BIA,
26. 437 F.2d 102 (1st Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
27. Dina, 793 F.2d at 475.
28. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
29. Id. at 830.
30. The Dina court also cited a similar Ninth Circuit case, Abdelhamid v. Ilchert,
774 F.2d 1447 (9th Cir. 1985). Dina, 793 F.2d at 476. In Abdelhamid, the court held
that a decision was committed to agency discretion by law and not subject to judicial
review.
31. 796 F.2d 373 (10th Cir. 1986).
32. See Kashani v. Nelson, 793 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 644
(1986); Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1986).
33. INA § 106(a), 8 U.S.C. § Il05a(a).
34. 796 F.2d at 376-77 (citing Salehi v. District Director, INS, 796 F.2d 1286
(10th Cir. 1986)).
35. Id. at 377.
36. 789 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1986).
bar[red] . . . appellate review of the original final deportation or-
der."' 37 The Nocon court held that the filing of a motion for reconsid-
eration does not toll the section 1105a six-month limitation period.38
"The general rule is that a motion to reopen deportation proceedings
is a new, independently reviewable order within the jurisdiction of
the court of appeals pursuant to section 1105a."39 Allowing petition-
ers extra time to file their petition for reconsideration would directly
contravene the congressional intent of "prevent[ing] successive,
piecemeal appeals from being used as a dilatory tactic to postpone
the execution of deportation orders."40
ATTORNEYS
While the involvement of attorneys in the immigration process
benefits individual aliens and society as a whole, occasionally a situa-
tion will arise where attorney involvement creates special immigra-
tion issues for judicial consideration. In 1986 three significant deci-
sions dealing with the attorney's role in the immigration process
were decided. 41
In Magallanes-Damian v. INS,42 the Ninth Circuit decided the
issue of whether an attorney's tactical decisions which backfire on
alien petitioners impinge upon the fundamental fairness of the hear-
ing in violation of the fifth amendment. The case involved aliens ar-
rested in a factory inspection. Their attorney advised them to con-
cede deportability in return for an extended period for voluntary
departure. This advice was based upon the attorney's belief that
pending amnesty legislation, which would make petitioners eligible
for lawful permanent residence, would be passed by Congress before
the agreed period for voluntary departure expired. When the legisla-
tion failed, petitioners alleged they were denied due process. 43
The Magallanes court recognized petitioners' due process rights,"
37. Id. at 1029 (citing INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(l)).
38. The Nocon decision is illustrative of the disagreement among the circuits over
section 1105a interpretation. In Bregman v. INS, 351 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1965), the
Ninth Circuit held that the section 1 105a limitation is suspended when the alien files a
motion to reopen before the BIA within six months of the final order. Another Ninth
Circuit case, Hyun Jcon Chung v. INS, 720 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1983) (modified
Mar. 26, 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984), explained this position by pointing
to congressional intent "to create a process in which there is a single judicial review of all
questions relating to an alien's deportation."
39. 789 F.2d at 1032 (citing Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18 (1964)).
40. Id. at 1033.
41. Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986); Committee of
Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 795 F.2d 1434, amended by 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986);
Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986).
42. 783 F.2d 931 (9th Cir. 1986).
43. Id. at 932-33.
44. Deportation hearings have been deemed civil proceedings and thus not subject
to the rigid procedural safeguards afforded criminal tribunals. United States v. Barraza-
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but held that failed tactical decisions do not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel. Absent egregious circumstances, aliens are
bound by the decisions of their attorneys.
In Committee of Central American Refugees v. INS,45 petitioners
represented a class of deportable aliens apprehended in the INS San
Francisco District who would have been, were, or would be subject
to transfer to alien deportation facilities away from the San Fran-
cisco area." Generally, the Attorney General has discretionary
power to choose the facilities where deportable aliens are to be de-
tained. Petitioners sought an injunction to prevent the Attorney
General from exercising this power. The petitioners claimed that
"the INS' policy of transferring aliens to remote detention facilities
violated the due process clause . . . because it effectively deprived
them of the right to counsel, the right to gather and present evi-
dence, and the right to apply for political asylum.""
The court held that a due process violation exists only when there
is "an established, ongoing attorney-client relationship. '49 The court
relied on Harisiades v. Shaughnessy5" to support its conclusion that
immigration powers, such as the power to choose the place of deten-
tion for deportable aliens, "are so exclusively entrusted to the politi-
cal branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial
inquiry or interference." 51
In Escobar Ruiz v. INS,52 the Ninth Circuit considered an appeal
concerning attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act
(EAJA) 8 The court held that hearings before the immigration
judge and BIA "are precisely the type of proceedings to which Con-
gress intended former section 2412(d) to apply." 54 When a litigant is
a "prevailing party" 55 within the meaning of the EAJA, attorney
Leon, 575 F.2d 218, 220 (9th Cir. 1978). Fifth amendment due process rights, however,
have been deemed necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. Id.; see also Paul v. INS,
521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975).
45. 795 F.2d 1434, modified, 807 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1986).
46. Cent. Am. Refugees, 795 F.2d at 1435.
47. For a discussion of the INS viewpoint on the transfer of aliens, see Schmidt,
Detention of Aliens, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 305 (1987), in this issue.
48. Cent. Am. Refugees, 795 F.2d at 1435.
49. Id. at 1439.
50. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
51. Cent. Am. Refugees, 795 F.2d at 1440.
52. 787 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1986).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d).
54. Escobar Ruiz, 787 F.2d at 1297.
55. To be a "prevailing party," a litigant must obtain relief "on the merits of the
underlying action." NLRB v. Doral Bldg. Serv., 680 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982).
fees can be awarded for fees incurred at all levels of the litigation. 6
BOND CONDITIONS
In National Center for Immigrants Rights v. INS,57 the Ninth
Circuit considered the Attorney General's statutory authority to in-
clude a condition in every appearance and delivery bond issued at a
deportation proceeding barring unauthorized employment. This case
was a class action with the petitioners consisting of "all those per-
sons who have been or may in the future be denied the right to work
pursuant to 8 C.F.R. sec. 103.6." 5' The INS argued that the Attor-
ney General is granted broad authority under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103,
1252(a) (1982) to promulgate bond regulations consistent with the
goals of the INA. While the court recognized the Attorney General's
wide discretion, 59 it held that the blanket regulation issued in this
case exceeded the legislative purpose of insuring the alien's appear-
ance at future deportation hearings.60 "The peripheral concern of the
Act with the employment of illegal aliens is not sufficient to support
the imposition of a no-employment condition in every bond." 61
CRIMINAL OFFENSES
By statute,62 aliens are excludable or can be deported if convicted
of a crime. Hence, numerous cases can be found at the administra-
tive, state, district, and appellate court levels dealing with the rights
of aliens who commit, or have committed, a criminal offense. In
1986 four significant cases dealing with this topic were decided at
the federal appellate level.63
In Crespo-Gomez v. Richard,64 petitioner was convicted of posses-
sion of cocaine and the INS subsequently commenced deportation
proceedings against him. A federal district court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction prohibiting petitioner's deportation concluding that
56. The Escobar Ruiz court dismissed petitioner's appeal on the grounds that he
was not a "prevailing party." If the BIA on rehearing, however, grants petitioner's claims
on the merits, attorney fees can still be had by Escobar Ruiz. Escobar Ruiz, 787 F.2d at
1298.
57. 791 F.2d 1351 (9th Cir. 1986), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3536
(1987). For an informative discussion of discretion in bond setting, see Gilboy, Setting
Bail in Deportation Cases: The Role of Immigration Judges, 24 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 347
(1987), in this issue.
58. Nat'l Center, 791 F.2d at 1353.
59. Id. at 1354.
60. Id. at 1356.
61. Id.
62. INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. 1986).
63. Crespo-Gomez v. Richard, 780 F.2d 932 (lth Cir. 1986); Trench v. INS,
783 F.2d 181 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986); Bull v. INS, 790 F.2d 869
(11th Cir. 1986); Monet v. INS, 791 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1986).
64. 780 F.2d 932 (11th Cir. 1986).
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INA section 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(B) (Supp. 1986) re-
quired two findings: (1) that the petitioner had been convicted of a
particularly serious crime; and (2) that he constituted a danger to
society.65 The district court also found that the statute required an
articulation of reasons beyond the mere citation of a conviction.66 On
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that "the fact that
the alien has committed a particularly serious crime makes that
alien dangerous within the meaning of the statute."6 7 Accordingly,
the government need only show that the alien has been convicted of
a particularly serious crime.6 8
In Trench v. INS,69 the Tenth Circuit heard the appeal of an alien
found deportable after being convicted in Colorado and Maryland
courts of three crimes involving "moral turpitude." The issues raised
on appeal were first, whether due process requires legal representa-
tion at a deportation hearing and second, whether the sixth amend-
ment right to effective counsel was violated when the attorney in the
underlying criminal case failed to warn petitioner of the immigration
consequences of a guilty plea to the criminal charges.
The Trench court upheld the traditional rule that, in a deportation
hearing, due process merely requires a full and fair hearing.70 The
court stated that "'the alien shall have the privilege of being repre-
sented . . . by such counsel, authorized to practice in such proceed-
ings, as he shall choose.' However, . . . 'the fact that an alien is
without counsel is not considered a denial of due process, if he does
not show that he was prejudiced thereby.' ,,1
The Trench court declined to decide the second issue, noting the
current split between the circuits. 2 Holding instead that "an alien
cannot collaterally attack the legitimacy of a state criminal convic-
65. Id. at 934.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Zardui-Quintana v. Richard, 768 F.2d 1213, 1222 (lth Cir.
1985) (Vance, J., concurring in result)).
68. Id. at 934-35.
69. 783 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1986).
70. Id. at 182-83 (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGraph, 339 U.S. 33, 49-51
(1950)).
71. Id. at 183 (citing INA § 202(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)); Burquez v. INS,
513 F.2d 751, 754 (10th Cir. 1975)).
72. Id. at 184. Compare Commonwealth v. Wellington, 305 Pa. Super. 24, 451
A.2d 223, 224-25 (1982) (ineffective assistance found); Edwards v. State, 393 So. 2d
597, 599 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (ineffective assistance found under state constitu-
tion) with United States v. Santelises, 509 F.2d 703, 704 (2d Cir. 1975) (no ineffective
assistance); Tafoya v. State, 500 P.2d 247, 251-52 (Alaska 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
945 (1973) (no ineffective assistance).
tion in a deportation proceeding,17 3 the court looked to Zinnanti v.
INS71 for guidance. Zinnanti holds that "[i]mmigration authorities
must look solely to the judicial record of final conviction and may
not make their own independent assessment of the validity of [a]
guilty plea."
75
A third significant 1986 criminal offense case is Bull v. INS,76
decided by the Eleventh Circuit. Bull involved a Nigerian student
who pled guilty in 1982 to a charge of passing a bad check. In 1984
Bull married a United States citizen and a year later he was arrested
by the INS. At his deportation hearing, Bull requested a continu-
ance so that he might file an application for adjustment of status.7 7
This request was denied. The decision was based on the belief that
Bull's Florida guilty plea would result in a denial of his adjustment
application.78 Relying on 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) and 8 U.S.C. §
1182(h) (Supp. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit court reversed.79 As an
exception to section 1182(a), section 1182(h) allows an alien to be
issued a visa if he can prove hardship to his spouse and "that his
admission into this country 'would not be contrary to the national
welfare, safety, or security of the United States.' "80 The court rea-
soned that in light of section 1182(h), Bull's criminal conviction is
not an absolute bar to approval of his section 1255(a) application;
The judge should have granted Bull's request for a continuance.
The Ninth Circuit decided a fourth significant 1986 criminal of-
fense case in Monet v. INS.8' In Monet, petitioner was a permanent
resident when the INS instituted deportation proceedings after
learning he had been convicted for a drug offense by a Danish court
in 1970. The issue in Monet was whether petitioner was ever "law-
fully" admitted into the United States within the meaning of 8
U.S.C. § 1182(c).82 The court held that Monet's concealment of his
criminal past made his entrance into the United States "unlawful."
Citing the Fifth Circuit case In re Longstaff,83 the Monet court
73. Trench, 783 F.2d at 184.
74. 651 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1981).
75. Id. at 421.
76. 790 F.2d 869 (11th Cir. 1986).
77. Id. at 870. The adjustment as sought pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) and
Bull's marriage to a United States citizen.
78. Id. Section 1255(a)(2) dictates that the alien must be "eligible" to receive an
immigrant visa in order to have an adjustment application granted, Since Bull's Florida
conviction made him "ineligible" to receive an immigrant visa, the immigration judge
reasoned that Bull's section 1255(a) application would be denied.
79. Bull, 790 F.2d at 872-73.
80. Id. at 872 (citing Mattis v. INS, 774 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1985)).
81. 791 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 753. Section 1182(c) provides for a discretionary waiver of deportation
to "'[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence' who have accrued seven years of
'lawful unrelinquished domicile.'"
83. 716 F.2d 1439, 1441 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984). For
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noted that "[t]he term 'lawfully' denotes compliance with substan-
tive legal requirements, not mere procedural regularity . . . . An
alien is subject to deportation if 'at the time of entry [he] was within
one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at
the time of such entry.' ,,84
DEPORTATION GROUNDS AND PROCEDURE
In Sachdev v. INS,8 5 the Second Circuit dealt with the argument
that unless the INS strictly complies with the notice requirements in
8 U.S.C. § 1155, a revocation of an approved visa petition has no
effect. The petitioner in Sachdev was granted a "second preference"
visa for being the unmarried son of a permanent alien. One week
after submitting his application for the visa, but prior to gaining ad-
mittance to the United States, petitioner married. Petitioner con-
cealed this marriage until ten months after entering the country, at
which time he filed a petition on behalf of his wife and son seeking
their admission into the United States. Upon learning of petitioner's
marital status, the INS commenced deportation proceedings.
The Sachdev court asserted that petitioner's reading of section
1153 would invite fraud by aliens seeking similar "second prefer-
ence" status.86 Moreover, the court upheld the current government
practice of having an incoming alien sign a "Statement of Marriage-
able Age Applicant" which clearly warns that marriage of the appli-
cant before being admitted to the United States could result in a
revocation of the visa.
In Umanzor v. Lambert,8 7 the Fifth Circuit decided a case involv-
ing habeas jurisdiction and the definition of "custody." Umanzor, a
citizen of El Salvador, was arrested and charged with illegal entry
into the United States. While Umanzor was being deported, yet still
in United States airspace, his attorney filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in the district court. The district court dismissed the
petition, reasoning that Umanzor was no longer in the custody of the
INS and that, consequently, jurisdiction could not attach.
Four important issues were addressed in Umanzor: first, whether
the entire matter was mooted by Umanzor's release in El Salvador;88
a discussion of the grounds for exclusion, see Schmidt, supra note 47, at 310-15.
84. Monet, 791 F.2d at 753-54 (citing In re Longstaff, 716 F.2d 1439, 1441-42
(5th Cir. 1983)).
85. 788 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 315 (1986).
86. Id. at 913.
87. 782 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 1302.
second, whether Umanzor was "in custody" at the time his petition
for a writ was filed;89 third, whether the district court had subject
matter jurisdiction to review Umanzor's order of deportation; 0 and
fourth, whether section 1105a(c) is constitutional. 91
The mootness issue was resolved by looking to the Supreme Court
decision in Carafas v. LaVallee9 2 and its Fifth Circuit progeny.'
Carafas holds that a prisoner's release from custody does not render
moot a court's habeas jurisdiction if there is a possibility of adverse
consequences flowing from the conviction.9 4 Applying the Carafas
rationale, the possibility of Umanzor's persecution upon his arrival in
El Salvador led the court to conclude that Umanzor's appeal was not
rendered moot.95
The second issue, the definition of "custody," was resolved by
looking to the Supreme Court decision in Braden v. Thirtieth Judi-
cial Circuit Court of Kentucky.98 Expanding the Fifth Circuit's ex-
isting rule,97 the Umanzor court held that a habeas petitioner can be
considered "in custody" when in the custody of an agent of the gov-
ernment. Thus, confinement on an airliner bound for El Salvador is
within the definition of "custody."
The court declined to decide the third issue, that of subject matter
jurisdiction, holding that petitioner could present no evidence to
demonstrate that his deportation was effected illegally. The court
stated that "[d]ue process is satisfied if the discretion was not exer-
cised in an arbitrary and capricious manner."98
The Supreme Court decision in Palmore v. United States9 helped
resolve the issue of the constitutionality of section 1105a(c). In Pal-
more, the Court stated that "[t]he decision with respect to inferior
federal courts, as well as the task of defining their jurisdiction, was
left to the discretion of Congress."100 Accordingly, since the lan-
guage of section 1105a(c) clearly shows congressional intent to limit
the jurisdiction of the courts, the Umanzor court must "obey its
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1303. INA § 106(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) provides: "An order of de-
portation ... shall not be reviewed by any court if [the alien] had departed from the
United States after the issuance of the order."
91. Umanzor, 782 F.2d at 1304.
92. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
93. Escobedo v. Estelle, 655 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1981).
94. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 237-38.
95. Umanzor, 782 F.2d at 1301.
96. 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
97. "Congress intended 'held in custody' as used in Sec. 1105a(a)(9) to require
'actual, physical custody in a place of detention.'" Umanzor, 782 F.2d at 1302 (citing
United States ex rel Marcello v. District Director of INS, 634 F.2d 964, 969 (5th Cir.
1981)).
98. Id. at 1304 (citing Tuan v. INS, 531 F.2d 1337, 1338 (5th Cir. 1976)).
99. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
100. Id. at 400.
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command." 10'
In Linnas v. INS,102 the Second Circuit decided a significant case
involving an ex-Nazi's constitutional challenges to the Holtzman
Amendment. 10 3 Specifically, Linnas raised two issues on appeal: first,
whether the Holtzman Amendment constitutes a bill of attainder in
violation of Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution'
and second, whether deportation to the Soviet Union would violate
his rights to due process and equal protection.105
Addressing the first issue, the Linnas court defined "bill of attain-
der" as "'a legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judi-
cial trial.' "o8 Relying upon Artukovic v. INS, 07 the court held that
"deportation is not punishment."'' 08 Thus, legislative activity con-
cerning deportation cannot constitute a bill of attainder.
The second issue raised by Linnas centered on his contention that
deporting him to the Soviet Union where a death sentence awaited
him "is in fact a disguised extradition."'1 9 Extradition in the absence
of a treaty, Linnas argued, would violate his rights to due process.
The Linnas court responded that "[e]xtradition is initiated by a for-
eign state."" 0 Since the impetus of Linnas' deportation came from
the United States government, there was no "extradition" in this
case. Furthermore, Linnas' claim that he would be denied due pro-
cess in the Soviet Union was rejected on jurisdictional grounds."'
Finally, the court stated, "Nazi war criminals are not a class of per-
sons entitled to enhanced scrutiny under the equal protection
clause."" 2
DOMICILE
INA section 244(a)(1) allows the Attorney General to suspend de-
portation and adjust the status of an alien if the alien has continu-
101. Umanzor, 782 F.2d at 1304.
102. 790 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 600 (1986).
103. INA §§ 241(a)(19), 243(h), 244(e), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(19), 1253(h),
1254(e).
104. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1028.
105. Id. Note that Linnas had been tried in absentia in the Soviet Union for his
war crimes and had been sentenced to death. Id. at 1027.
106. Id. at 1028 (citing Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323
(1866)).
107. 693 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 1982).
108. Linnas, 790 F.2d at 1030.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1031.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1032.
ously resided in the United States for seven years, is of good moral
character, and can demonstrate that deportation would result in ex-
treme hardship to the alien or to his spouse, parent, or child who is a
lawful citizen of the United States.11 In 1986 the Ninth Circuit de-
cided two significant cases11 4 relating to section 244(a)(1) and the
topic of domicile.
In Gonzalez Batoon v. INS,115 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the ef-
fect of the recent Supreme Court case of INS v. Rios-Pinedal8 upon
the BIA's discretion to deny relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1).
Gonzalez Batoon held that the BIA "may reject a petition to reopen
for suspension of deportation on discretionary grounds without con-
sidering whether the alien is eligible for relief under Sec.
1254(a) (1). "117 Nevertheless, as Rios-Pineda dictates, the BIA's dis-
cretion is subject to judicial review if unreasonable or arbitrary.11 8
The second significant 1986 domicile case was Chavez-Ramirez v.
INS,11 9 where the court accepted the task of articulating "a standard
for determining which visits abroad are temporary and which are
not" within the meaning of "returning resident immigrant."1 20 After
analyzing almost sixty years of case law,121 the court devised the fol-
lowing two prong test:
[W]e hold that a permanent resident returns from a 'temporary visit
abroad' only when (a) the permanent resident's visit is for 'a period rela-
tively short, fixed by some early event,' or (b) the permanent resident's visit
will terminate upon the occurrence of an event having a reasonable possibil-
ity of occurring within a relatively short period of time.' 2
ESTOPPEL
In Jaa v. INS,1 23 a Ninth Circuit court heard the appeal of a peti-
tioner whose permanent resident status application had been pending
with the INS for fifty-eight months before being denied.124 The peti-
113. INA § 244(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1).
114. Gonzalez Batoon v. INS, 791 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1986); Chavez-Ramirez v.
INS, 792 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1986).
115. 791 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1986).
116. 471 U.S. 444 (1985).
117. Gonzalez Batoon, 791 F.2d at 686.
118. Id. (citing INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444 (1985)); see also Faze-
lihokmabad v. INS, 794 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3475
(1987).
119. 792 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1986).
120. Id. at 933.
121. Id. at 935-36 (citing United States ex rel. Lesto v. Day, 21 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1927); United States ex rel. Alther v. McCandless, 46 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1931); United
States ex rel. Polymeris v. Trudell, 49 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1931)).
122. Chavez-Ramirez, 792 F.2d at 936-37 (citations omitted).
123. 779 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1986).
124. The INS offered two explanations for its delay: first, news of Jaa's pending
divorce; second, overwork due to the flood of applications filed by Iranians in 1981. Id. at
570.
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tioner argued that the INS should be estopped from denying Jaa's
application due to its lack of diligence in processing her application.
The court concluded otherwise. It stated that estoppel claims against
the government require a higher burden of proof than traditional es-
toppel claims. 125 The party asserting estoppel has a special burden of
proving affirmative government misconduct. Moreover, even when
affirmative misconduct is demonstrated, it will not be sufficient for
estoppel unless the conduct "threaten[s] to work a serious injustice
and . . . the public's interest would not be unduly damaged by the
imposition of estoppel.
'1 26
In Mukherjee v. INS,127 the Ninth Circuit decided another estop-
pel case using the same arguments as in Jaa. Of additional signifi-
cance, the court cited Lavin v. Marsh1 28 for the proposition that
"[p]ersons dealing with the government are charged with knowing
government statutes and regulations, and they assume the risk that
government agents may exceed their authority and provide
misinformation.
1 29
A third significant estoppel case was decided by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Paul v. Smith.130 In Paul, a United States citizen's continued
citizenship was contingent upon his living in the United States for
two consecutive years between his fourteenth and twenty-eighth
birthdays as was required by 8 U.S.C. § 1401. After failing to meet
the section 1401 requirements, Paul sought to estop the INS from
denying his citizenship. The basis for Paul's assertion was that on
numerous occasions over a nineteen year period when he crossed the
United States/Canada border, he was not notified by border officials
of the section 1401 requirements.
In denying Paul's argument, the Fourth Circuit relied on INS v.
Hibi.131 In Hibi, the court held that failure to publicize the rights of
125. In the Ninth Circuit, the traditional test for estoppel has four parts:
(I) The party to be estopped must know the facts;
(2) He must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the
party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it is so intended;
(3) The latter must be ignorant of the facts; and
(4) He must rely on the former's conduct to his injury.
Jaa, 779 F.2d at 571-72 (citing Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92, 96 (9th Cir. 1970)).
126. Jaa, 779 F.2d at 572 (citing United States v. Lazy FC Ranch, 481 F.2d 985,
989 (9th Cir. 1973)).
127. 793 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1986).
128. 644 F.2d 1378, 1383 (9th Cir. 1981).
129. Mukherjee, 793 F.2d at 1009.
130. 784 F.2d 564 (4th Cir. 1986).
131. 414 U.S. 5 (1973).
certain soldiers to become United States citizens did not estop the
government from enforcing statutory guidelines for naturalization
petitions. Building upon Hibi, the Paul court resolutely held that




In Quinn v. Robinson,133 the Ninth Circuit seized a valuable op-
portunity "to examine the parameters of a foreign sovereign's right
to bring about the extradition of an accused who maintains that the
offenses with which he is charged are of a political character.' 34
The court analyzed Quinn's charges using the two prong "inci-
dence" test defined in In re Ezeta.135 The first prong requires "the
occurrence of an uprising or other violent political disturbance at the
time of the charged offenses."' 3' The second prong requires "a
charged offense that is 'incidental to,' 'in the course of,' or 'in fur-
therance of' the uprising."' 37 Through proper application of the "in-
cidence" test, the Quinn court stressed that the desired goals of in-
ternational terrorist extradition and continued protection for
traditional domestic revolutionaries can be achieved without an aber-
ration of the judicial role. 138
FILIPINO WAR VETERANS
In Pangilinan v. INS,139 fifteen Filipino nationals "who served
honorably in the United States armed forces during World War
II,' '140 claimed they were entitled to United States citizenship pursu-
132. Paul, 784 F.2d at 566.
133. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 271 (1986). For an analysis
of Quinn and the political offense exception to extradition, see Comment, The Turning
Point Approaches: The Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 24 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 549 (1987), in this issue.
134. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 781.
135. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894); see also Quinn, 783 F.2d at 776; Eain v. Wilkes,
641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d
167 (2d Cir. 1980); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972).
136. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 797. The Quinn court defined "uprising" as "a revolt by
indigenous people against their own government or an occupying power." Id. at 807.
Furthermore, "[t]hat revolt can occur only within the country or territory in which those
rising up reside." Id. Thus, the Quinn court limited an uprising not only temporally, but
also spatially. With this strict definition, acts of international terrorism will almost al-
ways fail the "uprising" component of the incidence test.
137. Id. at 797. The "incidental to" component historically involves a liberal
search for a nexus between the act and the uprising. A consideration of the efficacy of
sp-.ecific tactics is unnecessary. This easily satisfied component is primarily constrained by
the geographic confines of "uprising." Id. at 809.
138. Id. at 805-10.
139. 796 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1986).
140. Id. at 1093.
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ant to sections 701 through 705 of the Nationality Act of 1940
(Act).14 1 The veterans claimed that actions of the Attorney General
to prevent Filipino participation under the Act were unconstitutional
and violated the obvious intent of Congress. In deciding the case, the
Ninth Circuit found that when drafting the Act, "Congress's intent
was to provide that 'if a man is ready to fight for our country we
ought to give him the benefits of citizenship without the normal
peacetime requirements of time, declaration of intention, and so
forth . . ' "142
After dismissing a number of INS threshold arguments, the
Pangilinan court held that the Act did not implicitly delegate to the
Attorney General the discretion to selectively deny the benefits of
the Act on policy grounds.143 The Attorney General's revocation of
naturalization authority in 1945 was beyond his statutory power and
erroneous.1 44 Therefore, "the only effective remedy available to 'rec-
tify the agency action taken,' ",145 was to grant citizenship to the fif-
teen Filipino veterans.
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In United States v. Ortega-Serrano,146 the Fifth Circuit ruled on a
stop and search issue. Using United States v. Brignoni-Ponce1 47 for
support, the Ortega-Serrano court set out five factors useful in deter-
mining the constitutionality of these stop and search cases, including:
(1) characteristics of the area where the vehicle is first encoun-
tered;1 48 (2) information about recent illegal immigration;1 49 (3) eva-
sive driving;1 50 (4) characteristics of the vehicle being driven by the
alien suspect(s);151 and (5) the apparent Hispanic ancestry of the
141. Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), as
amended by Second War Powers Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-507, 56 Stat. 176 (1942).
See generally Comment, Naturalization of Filipino War Veterans, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1171 (1985).
142. 796 F.2d at 1093 (citing Statements in Executive Session on S. 2208, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, Jan. 19, 1942).
143. Id. at 1098.
144. Id. at 1100.
145. Id. at 1103 (citing Harper v. Levi, 520 F.2d 53, 60 (9th Cir. 1975)).
146. 788 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1986).
147. 422 U.S. 873 (1975). Brignoni-Ponce holds that Hispanic appearance alone is
insufficient to justify a stop. Id. at 886-87.






In Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers' v. NLRB 53 and
Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986,154 the Ninth Circuit decided
whether an undocumented alien who remains in the United States,
and who has not been the subject of any INS deportation proceed-
ings, is barred from receiving backpay to remedy a National Labor
Relations Act1 55 violation. Both decisions rejected arguments that
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB156 dictates that an "undocumented alien
worker would never be entitled to backpay.' '15 7 Citing a "significant
line of precedent," 158 the Local 512 court held that only a discrimi-
nated worker's availability to work, not the employee's legal status,
determines his or her eligibility for backpay 1 69
MARIEL BOATLIFT
During the spring of 1980, a "freedom flotilla" brought to United
States ports over 100,000 Cuban refugees.1 60 On numerous occa-
sions, the INS seized boats carrying Marielitos and imposed substan-
tial fines on the boats' owners. The litigation erupting from this situ-
ation has arisen almost exclusively in the Eleventh Circuit. Two
significant cases dealing with the Mariel boatlift were decided in
1986.
Both Lyden v. Howerton81 and United States v. Armendaris1 6 2
are Eleventh Circuit cases dealing with boat owner challenges to
INS fines. The boat owners and captains in both cases argued that
"duress" is a proper defense to penalties under 8 U.S.C. § 1323.
Both the Lyden and Armendaris courts agreed with petitioners,
holding that duress is now an accepted defense. Looking to United
States v. Blanco"63 for support, the Lyden court promulgated the fol-
lowing three-prong test to establish a defense of duress:
[A] party must show that he or she performed the unlawful act because he
or she (i) was under an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury,
152. Id.
153. 795 F.2d 705 (9th Cir. 1986).
154. 791 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.) petition for cert. filed, 55 U.S.L.W. 3238 (1986).
155. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169. See generally Comment, Remedies for Undocumented
Workers Following A Constructive Discharge, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 573 (1987), in this
issue.
156. 467 U.S. 883 (1984).
157. Local 512, 795 F.2d at 716; accord Bevies Co., 791 F.2d at 1393.
158. Local 512, 795 F.2d at 717.
159. Id.
160. Lyden v. Howerton, 783 F.2d 1554, 1556 (11th Cir. 1986).
161. 783 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1986).
162. 790 F.2d 860 (11th Cir. 1986).
163. 754 F.2d 940 (11th Cir. 1985).
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(ii) had a well grounded fear that the threat would be carried out, and (iii)
had no reasonable opportunity to escape.
16'
MARRIAGE FRAUD
In Israel v. INS, 6 5 petitioner conceded her deportability in a
bond-reduction hearing, and was granted thirty days to voluntarily
depart. One condition for the voluntary departure grant was that the
petitioner not marry a United States citizen during the thirty day
departure period. 1 °6 Eleven days later, petitioner married a United
States citizen.1 ' 7 When petitioner filed a motion to reopen her depor-
tation hearing to allow consideration of her marital status, the immi-
gration judge rejected her application, citing "a breach of faith and
a misrepresentation to the Court." 6 " On appeal from a BIA dismis-
sal, petitioner asserted that the BIA acted arbitrarily.
Citing Sang Seup Shin v. INS,"6 9 the Israel court stated that
"[the BIA acts arbitrarily when it disregards its own precedents
and policies without giving a reasonable explanation for doing so."170
In In re Garcia,171 the BIA established a policy of reopening depor-
tation proceedings in situations like petitioner's "unless clear ineligi-
bility is apparent in the record."1172 Lacking a reasonable explanation
by the BIA or "clear ineligibility in the record," the Israel court
held that petitioner's motion to reopen should be granted.
MISCELLANEOUS OFFENSIVE USES OF THE COURT SYSTEM
The conduct of INS officials occasionally gives rise to a cause of
action against the INS. In 1986, two such cases arose. In Guerra v.
Sutton,173 several Hispanics fell prey to warrantless searches/raids
in their homes giving rise to Bivens"I and Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) 17 5 actions against several INS defendants. The district
court held that the rights of petitioners had been violated; however,
164. Lyden, 783 F.2d at 1557.
165. 785 F.2d 738 (9th Cir. 1986).
166. Id. at 739.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 739-40.
169. 750 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
170. Israel, 785 F.2d at 740 (citing Sang Seup Shin, 750 F.2d at 125).
171. 16 I. & N. Dec. 653 (BIA 1978).
172. Id.
173. 783 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir. 1986).
174. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcot-
ics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
175. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982).
the INS defendants were not found liable due to a qualified immu-
nity.178 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dis-
missal of the Bivens and FTCA claims. While recognizing a federal
officer's right to qualified immunity for actions taken in the course of
duty, 7 the court emphasized that such actions must be "reasonable
(even if mistaken). '1 78
In Chairez v. INS,"' the INS appealed from a district court rul-
ing that a private right of action is available to aliens detained inviolation of 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) 180 and 8 C.F.R. section 287.3
(1986).181 In reversing the district court, the Sixth Circuit held that
the requisite congressional intent to create a private right of action
was not present.
In its analysis, the Sixth Circuit utilized the four-part test estab-
lished in Cort v. Ash.182 This test allows a cause of action to be in-
ferred from a federal statute only if:
(1) the plaintiff is 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statutewas enacted;' (2) some 'indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,'
suggests that Congress wanted 'to create such a remedy [and not] to denyone;' (3) implying such a remedy for the plaintiff would be 'consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme;' and (4) the cause of ac-tion is not 'one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically theconcern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action.' 83
Failing to satisfy the Cort test, Chairez's cause of action was
dismissed.
RENUNCIATION OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
In Whitehead v. Haig,184 the Third Circuit decided an appeal
questioning whether either approval of a Certificate of Loss of Na-
tionality or denial of a passport application constitutes a "final ad-
ministrative denial" sufficient to trigger the five-year statute of limi-
tations on actions seeking a declaration of United States
176. Guerra, 783 F.2d at 1373.
177. Id. at 1374 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982); Davis
v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984)).
178. Id.
179. 790 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1986).
180. Section 1357(a)(2) provides, in pertinent part, that the INS may arrest an
alien when the officer:
has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in viola-tion of [the INA] . . .and is likely to escape before a warrant can be obtained
...but the alien arrested shall be taken without unnecessary delay for exami-
nation before [a hearing officer].
181. Similar to section 1357(a)(2), section 287.3 is the regulatory approach to thedisposition of cases of aliens arrested without a warrant.
182. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
183. Chairez, 790 F.2d at 546 (citing Curt, 422 U.S. at 78).
184. 794 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1986).
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citizenship. 85 The court held that the processing of a Certificate of
Loss of Nationality' 86 is apparently for the purposes of "governmen-
tal record-keeping and notification to the affected person of the exis-
tence of such record."'187 The process is so automatic and mechanical
that the court cannot regard it as a "final administrative denial."'
8
On the other hand, the denial of a passport application is not a
mechanical process and hence can be considered a "final administra-
tive denial" for purposes of INA section 1503(a).189 The gravamen
of the Whitehead court's argument was that an "administrative de-
nial" must involve some type of proceeding or contemplation of al-
ternatives before a "decision" is made. Mere bureaucratic procedure
is insufficient.
VISA PETITIONS
Legal problems arise when aliens want to come to the United
States for a very limited time and purpose. In 1986 three significant
decisions dealing with the rights of visa-seekers were decided.
In Wong v. Department of State, 90 the petitioners brought an ac-
tion for declaratory and injunctive relief after their visas were re-
voked. Reviewing the scope of the Secretary of State's visa revoca-
tion authority, the Ninth Circuit used 22 C.F.R. section 41.134(a)
(1983) to detail two instances when substantive defects in a visa ap-
plication would justify revocation.' 9' Because Wong's visa applica-
tion defects were merely procedural, section 41.134(a) does not au-
thorize visa revocation. 92
In Li Hing of Hong Kong, Inc. v. Levin,"'9 the petitioner was a
Hong Kong citizen employed by a California corporation. The
United States Consul in Hong Kong rejected petitioner's nonimmi-
grant visa application19 4 on the presumption that petitioner failed to
establish that he was a bona fide nonimmigrant .
95 The Ninth Cir-
185. INA § 360, 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a).
186. Pursuant to INA § 358, 8 U.S.C. § 1501.
187. Whitehead, 794 F.2d at 118.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 119.
190. 789 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1986).
191. First, when the applicant is ineligible under INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(Supp. 1986). Second, when the visa holder is ineligible under INA § 101(a), 8 U.S.C.
1101(a)(15) (Supp. 1986). Wong, 789 F.2d at 1385.
192. Wong, 789 F.2d at 1386.
193. 800 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1986).
194. Pursuant to INA § 214(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1184(b).
195. Li Hing, 800 F.2d at 970.
cuit distinguished Wong v. Department of State'96 when it affirmed
the district court's ruling that the judiciary lacks jurisdiction to re-view a consul's decision to grant or deny a visa.197 Noting a "long-
recognized [policy of] judicial nonreviewability,"'Il Li Hing held
that a "court is without power to substitute its judgment for that of
a Consul, acting pursuant to valid regulations promulgated by the
Secretary, on the issue of whether a visa should be granted or
denied." 98
A third significant visa petition case was decided by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in Abourezk v. Reagan.20 0 The plaintiffs in Abourezk were three
disparate groups which had invited a number of prominent aliens to
come to the United States to address and consult with them. Upon
the advice of the State Department, the consular officers denied the
aliens' visa requests, citing INA section 212(a)(27).210 Each group
filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in the district
court. These actions were defeated by a summary judgment motion.
On appeal, the Abourezk court was faced with numerous complex
issues of statutory construction. First, plaintiffs argued that section
212(a)(27) does not authorize exclusion on the basis of foreign pol-
icy considerations, as distinguished from the specific provisions of
section 212(a)(27). 0 2 Rejecting plaintiff's argument, the court as-
serted that the "broad language of (27) evinces no intent to ;estrict
the kinds of governmental concerns that would qualify."203
A second statutory construction issue which, unlike the first, was
successfully advanced concerned Congress' explicit use of the words"activities" and "engage" in section 2 12(a)(27). The court stated
that "[t]he specific reference to activities would be superfluous, in-deed, misleading, if entry or presence alone could justify
exclusion."20 4
A third and final statutory construction issue successfully ad-
196. See infra text accompanying notes 190-92. Wong was found distinguishableon four grounds. First, Wong involved the "revocation" of visas while Li Hing involvesthe "granting" of visas. Second, in Wong, the consular official's basis for revocation wasnot one of the grounds permitted by regulations. Third, in Wong the aliens were physi-cally present in the United States. Fourth, in Wong the question of jurisdiction was never
raised. Li Hing, 800 F.2d at 971.
197. Id. at 970.
198. Id. at 971.
199. Id.
200. 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 666 (1986).201. INA § 212(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27). INA section 212(a)(27) pre-cludes visas or entry for aliens who officials know or have reason to believe "seek to enterthe United States solely, principally, or incidentally to engage in activities which wouldbe prejudicial to the public interest, or endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the
United States."
202. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1053.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1054.
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vanced by plaintiff was that the government's interpretation of sec-
tion 212(a)(27) was so broad that it effectively destroyed section
212(a)(28) 20 5 and thereby nullified the restrictions placed by the
McGovern Amendment on the use of the latter.
Tying everything together, the court concluded by saying:
The Executive has broad discretion over the admission and exclusion of
aliens, but that discretion is not boundless. It extends only as far as the
statutory authority conferred by Congress and may not transgress constitu-
tional limitations. It is the duty of the courts, in cases properly before them,
to say where those statutory and constitutional boundaries lie.
206
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
On October 17, 1986, the 99th Congress gave final approval to the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).20 7 Passage
of IRCA culminates six years of congressional attempts to reach an
agreement on immigration reform.2 °8 IRCA is composed of three es-
sential sections: (1) sanctions for knowingly hiring undocumented
aliens; 209 (2) legalization for aliens who entered the United States
without documentation before January 1, 1982;21° and (3) special
protection and legalization for foreign agricultural workers.211
Title I of IRCA addresses control of illegal immigration. Section
101 declares "[i]t is unlawful for a person or other entity to hire, or
to recruit or refer for a fee, for employment in the United States
• ..an alien. ' 212 Penalties for violations of section 101 include sanc-
tions ranging from $250 to $10,000 per unauthorized alien and the
possibility of criminal penalties.213 This feature of IRCA is the first
time civil and criminal penalties have been imposed upon culpable
employers. Furthermore, the sanctions apply to all employers, re-
205. INA § 212(a)(28), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(28). INA section 212(a)(28) specifi-
cally delineates activities viewed by Congress as sufficient to justify exclusion.
206. Abourezk, 785 F.2d at 1061.
207. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat.
3359 (1987) [hereinafter IRCA]. For a discussion of the events leading up to the enact-
ment of IRCA, and an analysis of its major provisions, see Lungren, supra note 5.
208. "The bill itself is a surprising compromise between S.1200, the more enforce-
ment-minded bill passed by the Senate in September 1985, and H..R. 3810, the House
bill that worked its way slowly through committees" during the 1986 summer. 63 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 905 (1986). For an historical overview of the legislative process, see
Lungren, supra note 5, at 277-91.
209. IRCA § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3360 (amending/adding INA § 274A).
210. Id. §§ 201-204, 100 Stat. at 3394-3411 (amending/adding INA § 245A).
211. Id. §§ 301-305, 100 Stat. at 3411-34 (amending/adding INA §§ 101(a)
(15)(H), 214(c), 216, 210, 210A).
212. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3360 (amending/adding INA §274A(a)(1)).
213. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3366 (amending/adding INA § 274A(e)(4)(A)).
gardless of size, although they apply only to "knowing" violations. 14
IRCA itself does not define "knowing." Presumably, "the standard
requirement of subjective, actual knowledge, rather than an objec-
tive, 'reason to know' test, will apply. 215
Other important features of Title I include a directive to the At-
torney General to develop and implement verification procedures to
determine work eligibility;216 an eighteen month grace period before
implementation of employer sanctions; 217 a prohibition against dis-
crimination based on national origin or citizenship status; 218 an au-
thorization of appropriations for the INS and other enforcement-re-
lated endeavors;219 and increased fines of up to $10,000 for
transporting or harboring illegal aliens.220
Title II of IRCA grants temporary resident status to aliens who
have continuously resided in the United States without documenta-
tion prior to January 1, 1982. Eligible 221 aliens must apply for legali-
zation within twelve months of a date (not later than 180 days after
enactment of IRCA) designated by the Attorney General.22 Other
important features of Title II include a provision for Cuban-Haitian
adjustment;223 a provision updating the registry date from June 30,
1948 to January 1, 1972;224 and an appropriation of one billion dol-
lars per year for four years to reimburse state and local governments
for costs associated with legalization.225
Title III of IRCA provides relief for temporary agricultural work-
ers. The controversy over foreign agricultural workers almost re-
sulted in the failure of IRCA's passage. Growers contended that the
average American worker does not want to perform temporary agri-
cultural labor. With employer sanctions being a major element of
214. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3360 (amending/adding INA §§ 274A(I)(A),
(a)(2)).
215. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 991 (1986).
216. IRCA § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3361 (amending/adding INA § 274A(b)
(1)(A)).
217. Id. § 101(a), 100 Stat. at 3368 (amending/adding INA § 274(i)).
218. Id. § 102(a), 100 Stat. at 3374 (amending/adding INA § 274B). This feature
of IRCA places employers in a very delicate position. On the one hand, sanctions can
now be used to penalize employers for knowingly hiring undocumented aliens. On theother hand, employers can be penalized if they fire or refuse to hire authorized aliens or
foreign-looking citizens.
219. Id. § 11, 100 Stat. at 3381.
220. Id. § 112, 100 Stat. at 3381 (amending/adding INA § 274(A).
221. Aliens must establish that they entered the United States before January 1,
1982, and that they resided continuously in an unlawful status. Aliens lawfully admitted
as nonimmigrants and exchange students subject to the INA section 212(e) two-year
foreign residency requirement are not eligible for Title II legalization. Id. § 201(a), 100
Stat. at 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245(a)(2)(B),(C).
222. Id. § 201(a), 100 Stat. at 3394 (amending/adding INA § 245(a)(1)(A)).
223. Id. § 202, 100 Stat. at 3404.
224. Id. § 203, 100 Stat. at 3405 (amending/adding INA § 249).
225. Id. § 204, 100 Stat. at 3405.
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IRCA, growers wanted some assurance of the availability of a suffi-
cient labor pool.226 The major provision of Title III is the Schumer
plan, creating a "seasonal agricultural worker program.1227 Under
the Schumer plan, temporary and permanent residency is granted to
aliens who perform seasonal agricultural services in the United
States and who meet specific time requirements.228 Other important
features of Title III include the creation of a new H-2A classification
as an amendment to the current H-2 program;229 a new requirement
that the Secretaries of Labor and Agriculture annually assess United
States seasonal worker needs;230 the establishment of a Commission
of Agricultural Workers; 231 and a provision qualifying H-2A agricul-
tural workers for certain legal assistance. 32
Aside from the three main provisions, numerous other provisions
make scattered changes in current immigration laws. In section
315(b) of IRCA, Congress nullified the Supreme Court's strict ap-
proach to the "continuous physical presence" requirement of INA
section 244(a)(1 ).233 Under IRCA, "if the absence from the United
States was brief, casual, and innocent and did not meaningfully in-
terrupt the continuous physical presence, '234 an alien can still be
considered eligible for a section 244(a)(1) waiver.
In section 501 of IRCA, Congress provided for federal reimburse-
ment to states for "costs incurred by the State for the imprisonment
of any illegal alien or Cuban national who is convicted of a felony by
such State.2 3 5 Similarly, in section 701, Congress ordered the At-
torney General to expeditiously begin deportation proceedings of
aliens convicted of deportable offenses.
The future of IRCA is now in the hands of the INS, the courts,
and immigration practitioners. Representative Mazzoli commented
on IRCA saying "[iut's not a perfect bill, but its the least imperfect
226. The growers claim was disputed by organized farm workers who pointed to
high unemployment rates among domestic farm workers. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES
1127 (1986).
227. IRCA § 302, 100 Stat. at 3417 (amending/adding INA § 210). See generally
Lungren, supra note 5, at 299-300.
228. Id.
229. Id. § 301, 100 Stat. at 3411-17 (amending/adding INA § 216).
230. Id. § 303(a), 100 Stat. at 3422-31 (amending/adding INA § 210A).
231. Id. § 304, 100 Stat. at 3431.
232. Id. § 305, 100 Stat. at 3434 (amending/adding INA § 101(a)(20)).
233. See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984); Moreno v. INS, 779 F.2d 1086
(5th Cir. 1986); Sanchez-Dominguez v. INS, 780 F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1986).
234. IRCA § 315(b), 100 Stat. at 3439-40 (amending/adding INA § 244(b)).
235. Id. § 501(a), 100 Stat. at 3443.
bill we will ever have before us."'2 36 Fortunately, IRCA is built on
compromise and seems to provide a little for everyone.
A second significant 1986 legislative development was the enact-
ment of the Marriage Fraud Amendments. The Marriage Fraud
Amendments impose a two-year conditional residency requirement
upon aliens who marry United States citizens before they can gain
permanent resident status.237 Other important features of the Mar-
riage Fraud Amendments include a prohibition against aliens who
marry while in exclusion or deportation proceedings from obtaining
any preference status until the alien has resided outside the United
States for at least two years;238 criminal and immigration penalties
for marriage fraud; 3 9 and more restrictive second preference and
"K" nonimmigrant visa requirements.240
A third significant legislative development was the enactment of
the Consular Efficiency Amendments. The goal of the legislation is
to streamline the visa process by eliminating duplicative government
activity.241 Among other things, the legislation includes an extension
of the foreign-state chargeability benefits to those qualified to "fol-
low to join" an alien immigrant to the United States;242 a waiver of
fingerprint requirements for visa applications; 243 and the elimination
of the requirement that posts keep duplicate copies of visa petitions
and supporting documentation. 2"
CONCLUSION
The year 1986 came one day away from being a very uneventful
year in immigration law. 45 The passage of IRCA marked the culmi-
nation of six years of congressional attempts to address the problem
of illegal immigration in the United States. Seemingly cutting both
ways, IRCA provides tough employer sanctions while offering gener-
ous legalization provisions and multiple safeguards for the humane
administration of new policies.
The Supreme Court's per curiam decision in INS v. Hector clari-
fied the definition of "child" in an INA section 244(a)(1) context,
but did little to indicate how future immigration cases will be viewed
236. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 907 (1986).
237. Marriage Fraud Amendments § 2, 100 Stat. at 3537-42 (amending/adding
INA § 216(a)).
238. Id. § 5(b), 100 Stat. at 3543 (amending/adding INA § 204).
239. Id. §§ 2(d), 4(a), 100 Stat. at 3542, 3543 (amending/adding INA §§ 204(c),
275).
240. Id. § 3, 100 Stat. at 3542 (amending/adding INA § 214(d)).
241. 63 INTERPRETER RELEASES 907 (1986).
242. Consular Efficiency Amendments § 4, 100 Stat. at 3655 (amending/adding
INA § 202(b)).
243. Id. § 5, 100 Stat. at 3656 (amending/adding INA § 221).
244. Id. § 6, 100 Stat. at 3656-57 (amending/adding INA § 222).
245. IRCA was passed less than one day before adjournment of the 99th Congress.
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by the new Rehnquist Court. With certiorari granted in cases deal-
ing with eligibility for asylum, collateral attack of an executed de-
portation order, "materiality" in Nazi deportation cases, the consti-
tutional rights of Japanese-Americans during World War II and the
parameters of executive authority to grant or deny visa petitions pur-
suant to U.S.C. § 1182(a)(27), 1987 promises to provide much in-
sight into how the Rehnquist Court will shape immigration law.
Lower federal courts continue to battle with a multiplicity of is-
sues across the entire immigration spectrum. Interpretation 'and ap-
plication of IRCA promises to keep the courts quite occupied in the
near future.
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